Gambling for Re-election
Abstract We show that gambling-style behaviour is important in politics: politicians ‛gamble for re-election‚ in the context of a political leader selection. We exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs' individual decisions in the 2021 leadership election of Germany's centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when facing lower re-election chances. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election
Abstract We show that gambling-style behaviour is important in politics: politicians ‛gamble for re-election‚ in the context of a political leader selection. We exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs' individual decisions in the 2021 leadership election of Germany's centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when facing lower re-election chances. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election shows that MPs trade off leaders' expected quality against their riskiness. It provides a new explanation for intra-party dissent, and rationalises why parties may choose low quality leaders.